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ABSTRACT: I argue that there are two ways of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan 
that meaning is use. One accepts the view that the notion of meaning must be 
explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions and is committed to the epistemic 
conception of truth. The other keeps the notion of meaning and the truth-theo-
retic notions apart and is not committed to the epistemic conception of truth. I 
argue that Dummett endorses the first way of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan. I 
address the issue by discussing two of Dummett’s arguments against the realist 
truth-theoretic conception of meaning: the manifestation argument and the argu-
ment for the unintelligibility of classical logic. I examine the dialectic of those 
arguments and show that they rest on the assumption that meaning needs to be 
explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions.
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1. Two Ways of Construing the Slogan that Meaning is Use
Dummett holds that some considerations in the field of the theory of 
meaning prove that semantic realism1 is flawed. I argue that Dummett’s 
claim relies on the acceptance of the truth-theoretic conception of mean-
ing (TM):
TM: Truth and meaning are intimately connected to the extent that any 
meaning-theory must employ some truth-theoretic notion.
1 Semantic realism is the view that sentences relate to some reality that renders each 
of them determinately either true or false independently of our capacity to know that this is 
so. However, Dummett (1982: 56–57) says that to endorse semantic realism is also to have 
a specific conception of the manner in which sentences are rendered either true or false. 
This conception consists in the classical two-valued semantics that employs the notions of 
reference and satisfaction.
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My claim that Dummett accepts TM needs clarification. Is it not a 
commonplace that much of Dummett’s philosophical achievement is his 
criticism of TM? Doubtless, Dummett attacks the realist TM. According 
to him, any meaning-theory must be tripartite in a theory of reference, a 
theory of sense and a theory of force.2 The theory of reference determines 
recursively the conditions for the application to each sentence of that no-
tion which is taken as the central notion in the explanation of meaning. 
The theory of sense specifies what is involved in ascribing the knowledge 
of the theory of reference to speakers. In other words, the theory of sense 
is a theory of understanding that specifies that in which the knowledge 
of the theory of reference consists. As the knowledge of the theory of 
reference is an implicit knowledge, the theory of sense must correlate the 
knowledge of each theorem of the theory of reference with a practical 
linguistic ability.3 Realist TM meaning-theories employ classical truth as 
central notion. Accordingly, to know the meaning of a sentence amounts 
to knowing how its truth-value depends on the truth-theoretic values of 
its composing expressions, where this sort of dependence is explained in 
terms of reference and satisfaction conditions.4 Dummett’s criticism is 
that the classical notion of truth cannot serve as the central notion in the 
explanation of meaning since it makes it impossible to construct a proper 
theory of sense. This is to say that one cannot specify what is involved in 
ascribing to speakers the implicit knowledge of the theorems of a classical 
two-valued semantics that assigns epistemically transcendent truth-condi-
tions to sentences.
2 See Dummett (1976: 127): “Any theory of meaning was early seen as falling into 
three parts: the first, the core theory, the theory of reference; secondly, its shell, the the-
ory of sense; and thirdly, the supplementary part of the theory of meaning, the theory of 
force… The theory of reference determines recursively the application to each sentence 
of that notion which is taken as central in the given theory of meaning…The theory of 
sense specifies what is involved in attributing to a speaker a knowledge of the theory of 
reference”.
3 See Dummett (1976: 72): “We may therefore require that the implicit knowledge 
which he [the speaker] has of the theorems of the theory of meaning which relate to whole 
sentences be explained in terms of his ability to employ those sentences in particular 
ways…The ascription to him of a grasp of the axioms governing the words is a means of 
representing his derivation of the meaning of each sentence from the meanings of its com-
ponent words, but his knowledge of the axioms need not be manifested in anything but the 
employment of the sentences”.
4 As Davidson pointed out, it is important not to confuse the explanation we get when 
a meaning-theory is in place with the explanation of why the meaning-theory is correct. 
The correctness of the meaning-theory is tested against our grasp of the concept of truth. 
This is the reason why the notion of truth is treated as a primitive notion in classical truth-
theoretic meaning-theories even though, when a theory is in place, the sentences’ truth-val-
ues are shown to depend on reference and satisfaction. Cf. Davidson (1990: 300).
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It is another commonplace that Dummett’s alternative to the realist 
TM does not employ truth as its central notion. I contend that this is true in 
one sense and false in another. As said, Dummett accepts the view that the 
core part of any theory of meaning must determine recursively the applica-
tion to each sentence of that notion which is taken as central in the expla-
nation of meaning. Dummett says that the meaning of a sentence must be 
given in terms of the objective correctness condition for its assertion and 
that the conditions of objective correctness must be distinguished from 
the conditions of warranted assertibility, where the latter amount to the 
speaker’s personal entitlements to make assertions.5 Dummett draws the 
distinction between an assertion being warranted and an assertion being 
objectively correct and, using a terminology not always coherent,6 identi-
fies objective correctness with truth. Specifically, according to Dummett, 
the need for the notion of truth arises in order to account for the meanings 
of compound sentences, especially conditionals and sentences in the future 
tense, and to account for the informativeness of deductive inference.7 The 
difficulty Dummett has in mind can be generalised. For example, for any 
atomic sentence S, S and “it is assertible that S” have the same meaning 
because they have the same assertibility condition. But it is not the case 
that for any atomic S, “not S” and “it is not the case that S is assertible” 
have the same assertibility condition. In general, it is the need to cope 
with the principle that the meaning of a compound expression is a func-
tion of the meanings of its components that forces the distinction between 
warranted assertibility and objective correctness. Contrary to warranted 
assertibility, objective correctness must be a stable and absolute property 
of sentences, that is a property that sentences cannot lose across time and 
do not possess in varying degree.
The model Dummett looks at is the intuitionistic semantics for math-
ematical sentences according to which the meanings of the composing 
expressions of a mathematical sentence determine a decidable relation be-
tween that sentence and a mathematical construction that obtains just in 
case that construction is a proof of that sentence.8 In other words, to know 
the meaning of a mathematical sentence is to know the condition that must 
obtain in order for the sentence to be proved. Provability is a stable and 
absolute property of mathematical sentences. So, if one identifies truth 
in mathematics with provability, one can describe the knowledge of the 
5 See Dummett (1976: 120): “We have seen that, in the general case, we have to 
consider as primary, in determining the content of an assertion, not the speaker’s personal 
entitlement to make the assertion, but the condition for its objective correctness”.
6 For an allusion to Dummett’s contrasting terminology see Prawitz (1987: Section 7). 
7 Cf. Dummett (1976: 83–86, 115–116) and (1991: 168, 175–176).
8 Cf. Dummett (1982: 59).
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meanings of mathematical sentences as knowledge of their (epistemically 
constrained) truth-conditions. Dummett’s idea has been interpreted as the 
attempt to extend the intuitionistic semantics for mathematics to the rest 
of the language by employing a more general notion of objective correct-
ness as notion of truth in place of provability. Objective correctness must 
be shaped in terms of an epistemic notion in order to be guaranteed that 
whenever a sentence is objectively correct one can know that this is so. 
In spite of the role that Dummett recognises to the notion of truth, in the 
sense in which it amounts to objective correctness, he does not attempt 
any definition or explanation of truth from the antirealist perspective and 
confesses that it is certainly a difficult task to give an explanation of truth 
within a theory of meaning in terms of verification.9 Other philosophers, 
who are sympathetic to Dummett’s antirealism, have tried to explain truth. 
Prawitz (1987: 155) says that a sentence is true if and only if there is – in 
a tenseless sense of “is” – a direct or canonical verification of it. Ten-
nant (1987: 136) suggests a similar definition. Wright (1992) proposes to 
identify truth with superassertibility and says (1992: 60–61) that super-
assertibility is the notion that is needed to develop Dummett’s antirealist 
programme. Wright (1987a) maintains that the notion of superassertibility 
enables one to construct the Tarskian recursive clauses for connectives 
in accord with antirealism, provided that the proof theory employed in 
the metalanguage makes use only of logical constants whose semantics is 
construed along the sort of intuitionistic lines, so that one can give a truth-
functional antirealist theory of meaning. In which sense, then, is it true 
that Dummett dethrones the notion of truth in theory of meaning? That is 
true only in the sense that, according to Dummett, truth cannot be taken as 
the two-valued and primitive notion as the realist (e.g. Davidsonian) TM 
meaning-theories do. Truth must be clarified, if not defined, by means of 
another notion, a notion that, like direct or canonical verification, can be 
employed to explain understanding of meaning first and then to spell out 
an epistemic characterisation of truth.
The foregoing lead to the conclusion that the commonplace that Dum-
mett opposes TM might be very misleading. Dummett opposes the realist 
TM. However, the conception of meaning he professes is an antirealist 
version of TM, according to which to know the meaning of a sentence is to 
know how its truth-value depends on the truth-theoretic values of its com-
posing expressions. Of course, truth conditions must be so construed that 
they are not epistemically transcendent. This conclusion should not strike 
us as very surprising since Dummett himself distinguishes between strong 
9 Dummett (1976: 116) recognises that “It is far from being a trivial matter how the 
notion of truth, within a theory of meaning in terms of verification, should be explained”.
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and weak truth-theoretic theories of meaning and says explicitly that se-
mantic realism implies strong truth-theoretic theories in which truth is 
classically two-valued and taken as primitive, while semantic antirealism 
implies weak truth-theoretic theories in which truth is epistemically con-
strained and characterised in terms of direct or canonical verification.10
Though not surprising, the above conclusion is relevant in order to 
understand the limits of Dummett’s criticism of the realist notion of truth. 
My claim is that Dummett’s criticism of the realist notion of truth stands 
only under the condition that one endorses TM. So, the point of contrast 
between Dummett and his opponents is not whether meaning must be 
explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions, rather it is about what no-
tion of truth must be involved in such explanation. Dummett advocates 
an epistemic notion of truth, while his opponents advocate the classical, 
epistemically transcendent notion of truth. My claim might sound surpris-
ing. Indeed, a further commonplace is that Dummett’s theory of meaning 
is inspired to Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning is use. The manifestation 
constraint is Dummett’s explication of Wittgenstein’s slogan and consists 
in the view that any theory of meaning must include the theory of sense, 
which specifies that in which the knowledge of meaning consists.11 Dum-
mett says that a theory that meets the manifestation constraint specifies 
not only what speakers know when they know the meanings of the expres-
sions of the language they speak but also what such knowledge consists 
in, in such a way that one would acquire the meanings of the expressions 
of the language under study, were he taught the practical abilities that the 
theory of sense describes. There is, however, another way of construing 
the slogan that meaning is use, which accepts the manifestation constraint 
but rejects TM. I claim that this second way of construing the slogan that 
meaning is use is more Wittgensteinian and is compatible, in a sense to 
be specified, with the realist notion of truth. In the next sections, I will 
argue for this claim by examining the dialectic of two arguments that 
Dummett presents against the classical notion of truth: the manifestation 
argument and the argument for the unintelligibility of classical logic. I 
will show that the conclusions of those arguments follow only if one 
subscribes to TM.
10 Cf. Dummett (1991: 113, 161–62).
11 See, for example, Dummett (1977: 376): “An argument of this kind is based upon 
a fundamental principle, which may be stated briefly, in Wittgensteinian terms, as the prin-
ciple that a grasp of the meaning of an expression must be exhaustively manifested by the 
use of that expression… and hence must constitute implicit knowledge of its contribution 
to determining the condition for the truth of a sentence in which it occurs; and an ascription 
of implicit knowledge must always be explainable in terms of what counts as a manifesta-
tion of that knowledge, namely the possession of some practical capacity”.
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2. The Manifestation Argument
The manifestation argument starts from three premises and has the form 
of a reductio.12
(1) Knowledge of meaning is knowledge of classical truth-condi-
tions.
(2) Knowledge of meaning consists in the capacity to recognise, if 
appropriately placed, whether or not the truth-conditions obtain.
(3) Classical truth-conditions are such that, if actualised, they need 
not be recognisably so.
Consider a sentence S whose truth-condition, if actualised, need not be 
recognisably so. According to (2), every speaker who knows the meaning 
of S must be able to recognise that its truth-condition obtains whenever 
it obtains. But S’s truth-condition might obtain without being possible to 
know that this is so. Therefore we are not guaranteed that the knowledge 
of S’s meaning consists in a capacity that can be ever exercised. This is an 
absurd consequence since to have a capacity is to be able to do something 
that can be done. Nobody possesses a capacity to do what cannot be done. 
The conclusion Dummett draws is the negation of (1):
(4) Knowledge of meaning is not knowledge of classical truth-condi-
tions.
And from (4), Dummett derives
(5) The realist notion of truth is flawed.
It might be objected that Dummett’s reductio rests on (2), which expresses 
the constitutive view of the manifestation constraint. The constitutive view 
of the manifestation constraint differs from the methodological constraint 
that the empirical adequacy of the theories of meaning amounts to consist-
ency with observed patterns of assent to and dissent from whole sentences 
in conformity with observational evidence. The methodological constraint 
is met also by those philosophers who take the realist TM meaning-theories 
to provide a representation of linguistic competence. They hold that the 
ascription of the implicit knowledge of the theory, which for each sentence 
specifies its classical truth condition, amounts to the ascription of internal 
states and allows for making testable predictions about speakers’ behav-
iour. On this view, speakers’ knowledge of truth conditions is explained by 
hypothesising internal states that constitute the implicit knowledge of the 
classical semantics of their language.13 By contrast, the constitutive view 
12 I borrow this presentation of the manifestation argument from Tennant (1987).
13 Smith (1992) points out the distinction between the descriptive stance, which asks 
for the analysis of linguistic behaviour, and the explanatory stance, which asks for the ex-
planation of it. For example, Evans (1981) advocated the explanatory stance. According to 
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regards linguistic behaviour not as something in need of explaining, but 
in need of analysing. Accordingly, linguistic behaviour is not explained, 
but analysed in order to determine the complex of linguistic abilities that 
constitute the mastery of the language. To know that a certain expression 
has a certain meaning is to be able to make a certain use of that expression 
and it must be the aim of the theory of meaning to describe such patterns 
of use.14 Some advocates of the realist notion of truth oppose Dummett’s 
reductio by rejecting (2), namely the constitutive view. My claim, instead, 
is that Dummett’s argument rests on the acceptance of TM. So, one might 
oppose Dummett’s argument by rejecting TM.
It helps to notice the importance of TM in Dummett’s criticism of the 
realist notion of truth, if one considers (1)–(4) attentively. (4) prevents 
one from identifying knowledge of meaning with knowledge of classical 
truth-conditions. By itself, this is not yet a difficulty for the realist notion 
of truth. In order to derive the stronger conclusion (5), that the realist no-
tion of truth is flawed, from (4) one needs to assume TM. In effect, the 
impossibility of explaining meaning in terms of classical truth conditions 
implies the rejection of the realist notion of truth only if it is agreed that 
the adoption of a truth-theoretic notion can be criticised if it precludes 
the construction of an adequate theory of meaning.15 And this much is a 
consequence of TM, given that TM says that meaning is to be explicated 
in terms of truth-theoretic notions. Indeed, if Dummett’s tripartite con-
ception of a theory of meaning is accepted, there are two ways in which 
meaning can be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions: either by 
adopting the classical semantics as the base for the theory of meaning and 
then providing a corresponding theory of understanding or by adopting a 
different notion – say verification – for explaining understanding of mean-
ing first and then employing such notion in order to shed light on truth and 
construct a semantics alternative to the classical one. Dummett’s mani-
festation argument shows that we cannot adopt the classical semantics 
and provide a satisfactory theory of understanding. On the other hand, the 
notion needed to explain the understanding of meaning cannot sustain the 
Evans, to ascribe the implicit knowledge of the theory of meaning to a speaker is to ascribe 
internal states that are the bases of dispositions to react in regular ways to the sentences of 
the language, basically to accept them as true in the circumstances specified by the theory 
of meaning.
14 According to Prawitz (1977: 37) to each sentence A there must be certain kinds of 
behaviour B
A
 such that the theory of meaning implies that if x knows the meaning of A 
then x manifests B
A
.
15 See Dummett (1991: 303): “A semantic theory may be criticised on the ground 
that it cannot be extended to a coherent or workable meaning-theory at all; and since, by 
definition, a semantic theory can be so extended, this criticism amounts to saying that it is 
not, after all, a genuine semantic theory”.
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classical semantics. Under the assumption of TM, then, the realist notion 
of truth turns out to be incompatible with meaningfulness.
I maintain that the realist notion of truth can be defended by reject-
ing TM and endorsing a more Wittgensteinian conception of meaning. If 
one works within a conception of meaning that is not truth-theoretic, the 
impossibility of employing the realist notion of truth to explain meaning 
provides no longer a compelling reason for abandoning that notion of 
truth. So, one might concede that a theory of meaning must be a theory of 
understanding and therefore be based on an epistemic notion that draws 
essentially on mastery of rules of evidence for warranted assertions and 
inferences, but one might reject the view that truth needs to be clarified 
in terms of the same epistemic notion. There is a conception of meaning 
that is more Wittgensteinian than TM and is not truth-theoretic. This is 
the conception of meaning as use (henceforth UM) or conceptual role 
semantics according to which to have a certain meaning is to be governed 
by certain basic and explanatory fundamental patterns of use.16 A mean-
ing-theory inspired to UM describes the meaning-constitutive patterns 
of use without employing any truth-theoretic notion. Truth-conditions 
are derived from the theory of meaning together with the deflationary 
schemata. As Horwich (1998: 72–73) says, a sentence’s truth-condition 
is a consequence of its meaning, not constitutive of it. What UM rejects, 
then, is the view that to understand a sentence involves knowing its truth 
condition in a stronger sense than the truism that someone who under-
stands a sentence and the proper use of the truth-predicate is thereby able 
to understand the corresponding instance of the Tarskian schema.17 In 
this sense, UM is not truth-theoretic. It does not employ any truth-theo-
retic notion in order to give the theoretical representation of the linguistic 
competence and it is not under the obligation to shed light on the notion 
of truth by means of the notion that serves to explain meaning and un-
derstanding.
UM satisfies Dummett’s manifestation constraint. According to UM, 
what a person needs to know in order to be a competent speaker is how 
to use expressions in accordance with their meaning-constitutive patterns 
of use.18 The knowledge of meanings is theoretically represented by the 
16 See for example Horwich (1998), (2005).
17 I borrow this point from Skorupski (1986: 153).
18 One might object that Dummett’s manifestation objection still has not been ad-
dressed. Indeed, which use of a sentence constitutes its meaning? If one answers that it 
must be the disposition to accept “p” when p, then one has the problem of undecidables. 
And if one comes up with some other meaning-constituting usage for sentences – some-
thing that avoids the problem of undecidables – then why couldn’t that solution be equally 
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theory that describes the meaning-constitutive patterns of use. Indeed, 
one of the advantages of UM is that it is able to accommodate the ex-
planatory link between meaning and use, namely the fact that speakers 
use words as they do because of their meanings.19 My contention is that 
UM is also compatible with the realist notion of truth. More precisely, 
I contend that UM is compatible with the realist notion of truth, if UM 
succeeds in defending the intelligibility of classical logic. According to 
UM, the meanings of the logical constants supervene on their introduc-
tion and elimination rules. The classical logical constants do possess clear 
introduction and elimination rules. Assume this is enough for them to be 
meaningful. In this case the law of excluded middle is taken to be partly 
constitutive of the meanings of negation and disjunction. But if the law of 
excluded middle holds in a deductive system, and if Tarski schema also 
holds in that system, then the principle of bivalence can be derived,20 and 
Dummett regards the principle of bivalence as one of the hallmarks of the 
realist notion of truth.
Dummett gives an argument aiming to prove that the introduction and 
the elimination rules for the classical logical constants do not succeed in 
conferring a meaning to them and, consequently, that classical logic is not 
intelligible. In the following section, I will show that Dummett’s attack 
to the intelligibility of the classical logical constants assumes TM and, 
thereby, begs the question against UM.
exploited by the advocate of the classical truth-theoretic conception of meaning? One 
should grant that to know the meaning of an undecidable sentence cannot consists in the 
ability to ascertain that it is true whenever it is. Rather, the knowledge of the meaning of 
an undecidable sentence need to be explained via the knowledge of the meanings of the 
words that form that sentence and compositionality, where the knowledge of the meanings 
of the composing words is constituted by the acceptance of sentences that are decidable 
and/or of patterns of inference involving those sentences. The crucial point is that, contrary 
to the classical truth-theoretic conception of meaning, the advocate of the use conception 
of meaning does not have to justify the claim that such linguistic abilities constitute the 
implicit knowledge of epistemically transcendent truth-conditions.
19 Cf. Horwich (1998: 6).
20 Here is the derivation:
(1) True p ↔ p   (Disquotational Schema)
(2) p  ~p    (Law of Excluded Middle)
(3) p    assumption
(4) True p    from (1), (3) and MPP
(5) ~p    assumption
(6) True ~p    from (1), ~p/p, (5), and MPP
(7) True p  True ~p   from (4), by vel introduction
(8) True p  True ~p   from (6), by vel introduction
(9) True p  True ~p   from (2), (3), (5), (7), (8) by vel elimination
(Bivalence) True p  False p  from (9) by df. of “False”
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3. The Intelligibility of Classical Logic
Dummett’s argument against the intelligibility of classical logic relies on 
the proof that the meanings of the classical logical constants, as deter-
mined by the rules of inferences, do not validate classical logic, in the 
sense that the analysis of their meanings does not provide the explanation 
of the validity of the classical rules of inference. The argument, then, as-
sumes that a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of the logical 
constants is that the analysis of their meanings provides the explanation of 
the validity of the logical rules of inference. I contend that this assumption 
is not compulsory on UM. Dummett’s argument goes like follows:
(1) The meaningfulness of the logical constants requires that the 
rules of inference be validated by whatever constitutes their 
meanings.
(2) Given UM, the classical rules of inference are not validated by 
what constitute the meanings of the classical logical constants.
Therefore
(3) If UM is correct, the classical logical constants are not meaning-
ful.
The notion of validation is crucial and deserves clarification. As said 
above, validation is an explanation of the validity of the logical rules of 
inference grounded on the analysis of the meanings of the logical con-
stants.21 According to UM, meanings are individuated by constitutive 
patterns of use. In particular, the meanings of the logical constants are 
constituted by their introduction and elimination rules. The validation of 
the logical rules of inference, then, ought to result from the analysis of the 
rules of introduction and elimination of the logical constants. To achieve 
this result, Dummett says, the rules of introduction must be (i) constitutive 
of the meanings of the logical constants and (ii) in harmony with the rules 
of elimination.22 The harmony constraint guarantees that the addition of 
a logical constant to a language produces a conservative extension of that 
language. The fact that one obtains a conservative extension by adding a 
logical constant proves that the rules of inference governing the meaning 
of that logical constant are truth-preserving. In fact, whatever notion of 
21 As Dummett fully recognises one cannot really give justification to basic rules 
of inferences. Any attempt to do so would require logic, and hence be circular. However, 
Dummett says, one can gain a kind of explanation of why the rules are truth-preserving 
– an explanation that involves deploying those very rules. Cf. Dummett (1991: 202–4).
22 Cf. Dummett (1991: 11). The rule of introduction and the rule of elimination of a 
logical constant are in harmony if and only if the conclusion one obtains by the application 
of the rule of elimination is already justified by the warrants for the premises to which the 
rule of elimination is applied. 
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truth one works with, if a system of rules of evidence is sound and the 
introduction of a new logical constant generates a conservative extension 
of it, the system is guaranteed to remain sound after that introduction, 
since the rules of inference for the added logical constant lead to the same 
conclusions, in the original restricted vocabulary, that could have been 
deduced before the introduction.
Dummett’s objection to classical logic is that the introduction and the 
elimination rules for the classical logical constants are not in harmony. To 
make the point clear, consider the following example.23 Suppose the law of 
excluded middle is regarded as constitutive of the meanings of negation and 
disjunction. It follows that one is warranted in asserting A  ~A independ-
ently of any warrant for asserting either disjunct, because even though one 
has no warrant for asserting either A or ~A, one is warranted in asserting A 
 ~A as an instance of the law of excluded middle. Further, suppose one is 
warranted in asserting the two conditionals A → B and ~A → B, but one 
is not justified in asserting B. By applying the elimination of disjunction, 
one gives justification to the assertion of B, which by assumption was not 
justified before the application of the rule of elimination of disjunction. 
This shows that if one takes the law of excluded middle to be (partly) 
constitutive of the meaning of disjunction, the introduction and the elimi-
nation rules for disjunction cannot be in harmony. The law of excluded 
middle has the consequence that some sentences become assertible in cir-
cumstances in which previously they were not. Before introducing the law 
of excluded middle, in the circumstances in which one was not justified 
in asserting A and was not justified in asserting ~A, one was not justified in 
asserting B, even though one was justified in asserting A → B and ~A → B. 
And, by assumption, B could not be justified otherwise. In sum, the intro-
duction of classical disjunction and classical negation, whose meanings 
are (partly) constituted by the law of excluded middle, into a language 
does not produce a conservative extension of that language and the proof 
of soundness grounded on the analysis of the meanings of the logical con-
stants is lost. Thus, if one accepts UM, one cannot explain the validity of 
the classical rules of inference through the analysis of the meanings of the 
classical logical constants. Premise (2) of Dummett’s argument is sound.
However, it is not obvious that the advocate of UM must accept 
premise (1). Indeed, my claim is that the advocate of UM is not commit-
ted to (1) and, therefore, need not go on contraposing premise (1) from 
premise (2). The close examination of the reason why Dummett holds 
23 My example elaborates on an example given by Wright (1987b: 334–5).
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that one ought to accept premise (1) reveals how deeply Dummett is com-
mitted to TM. The intelligibility of classical logic can be defended within 
the framework of UM by endorsing the view that any consistent set of 
rules of inference determines the meanings of logical constants. Given 
that the classical rules of inference are clearly stated and consistent, the 
result is that the classical logical constants are assigned determinate mean-
ings and the understanding of such meanings requires nothing more than 
conformity to those rules of inference. Dummett rejects this account of 
the meaningfulness of the classical logical constants. The reason of Dum-
mett’s rejection is the following. As said above, Dummett holds that two 
constraints must be satisfied in order for a rule of inference to determine 
the meaning of a logical constant. (i) The correctness condition for the 
assertion made by means of a sentence containing that logical constant 
must always coincide with the existence of a deduction, by means of that 
rules of inference, to that sentence from correct premises none of which 
contains the logical constant in question. That is to say that the introduc-
tion rules must be constitutive of the meanings of the logical constants. (ii) 
The rules of introduction and the rule of elimination must be in harmony. 
The second constraint is compulsory if one wants to regard the meanings 
of the sentences not containing logical constants as constituted prior and 
independently of their embedding in logical operations. The point, Dum-
mett says, is that one needs to regard the meanings of the sentences not 
containing logical constants as constituted prior to and independently of 
their embedding in logical operations, otherwise one is forced to accept 
that the meanings of those sentences are constituted also by such logical 
operations. The trouble is that no restriction can be placed upon the sen-
tences that might feature in logical operations, with the result that there is 
no proper fragment of the language that can be mastered in such a way that 
a complete understanding of it might be attained, since in order to master 
the meaning of an expression the speaker must be able to understand the 
meanings of all other expressions of the language. Dummett’s objection, 
then, is that if UM rejects the constraint of harmony – premise (1) – then 
UM is bound to inflate into holism.24 In other words, if UM is not under 
the obligation to provide a validation of the logical inferential role, taking 
meaning to be constituted in part also by the logical inferential role, the 
meanings of the expressions cannot be determinate in advance of their oc-
curring into logical inferences and the meanings of the logical constants 
cannot keep faith with the meanings of the sentences among which they 
24 See, for example, Dummett (1978: 302–3): “The rules of inference which are ap-
plied in our language are, on such a molecular view, justified precisely by this fact, the fact, 
namely, that they remain faithful to the individual contents of the sentences which occur in 
any deduction carried out in accordance with them”.
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regulate the inferences, since there is nothing to keep faith with. There-
fore, no speaker can acquire a complete mastery of any fragment of the 
language not including the logical constants. And, Dummett argues, ho-
lism follows.
As some commentators have pointed out, Dummett’s argument is not 
sound.25 The tenet of holism is that no language can be divided into frag-
ments allowing for a speaker to master each of them stage by stage in such 
a way that at each stage his competence is complete. However, holism is 
not implied by the rejection of the constraint of harmony. What follows 
from the rejection of the constraint of harmony is the inconsistency of 
UM with the possibility that any class of expressions not including the 
logical constants form a fragment of the language that can be completely 
mastered independently of any other fragment. This does not imply that 
the language cannot be divided into fragments allowing the acquisition of 
complete competence to proceed stage by stage. It implies only that any 
fragment, in which the language can be so divided, must include the logi-
cal constants. In other words, the competence of any fragment into which 
the language can be divided must involve the logical competence (or some 
relevant part of it).
We can give the following analysis that shows that premise (1) is 
implied by TM. The advocate of UM takes assertion conditions and in-
ferential role as equally constitutive of meaning. By contrast, Dummett 
holds that the inferential role needs to be grounded on an independently 
constituted notion of meaning. Accordingly, the meaning of a sentence 
is independent of its inferential role and must be given before it. In this 
respect, Dummett makes it evident how deeply his picture is committed to 
TM. The inferential role of a sentence must be grounded on a single key 
notion: the notion of the condition under which the sentence can be used 
to make an objectively correct assertion. Both the Dummettian antirealist 
and his realist opponent, who accepts TM, identify those conditions with 
the conditions under which the sentence is true. Where the Dummettian 
antirealist and his realist opponent part company is the nature of truth: ac-
cording to the Dummettian antirealist, truth must be explained in terms of 
assertibility, whereas, according to his realist opponent, truth is epistemi-
cally transcendent. The point is that both realist and antirealist truth-theo-
retic meaning-theories converge on the idea that knowledge of meaning is 
knowledge of truth conditions. Indeed, antirealists must accept (iii) if they 
are willing to accept (i) and (ii):26
25 See, for example, Wright (1987b: 335) and Skorupski (1988: 520).
26 I borrow this point from Prawitz (2005: 681).
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(i) The truth of a sentence can be defined as the existence of a direct 
or canonical verification of it.
(ii) To know the meaning of a sentence is to know what counts as its 
direct or canonical verification.
(iii) To know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-condi-
tion.
In general, then, both realist and antirealist TM meaning-theories explain 
the meaning of a logical constant C as given by the truth conditions of the 
sentences in which C is the main logical constant. For example, both real-
ist and antirealist TM meaning-theories explain the meaning of conjunc-
tion by the following equivalence:
“A  B” is true if and only if “A” is true and “B” is true.
The distinctive mark of antirealism is that truth is explained in terms 
of direct or canonical verification:
There is a direct or canonical verification of “A  B” (= “A  B” is 
true) if and only if there is a direct or canonical verification of “A” 
(= “A” is true) and there is a direct or canonical verification of “B” 
(= “B” is true).
This analysis fits well Dummett’s idea that the introduction rules are 
(i) constitutive of the meanings of the logical constants and (ii) proved to 
be valid in virtue of the meanings of the logical constants. Indeed, for ex-
ample, if the introduction rule for conjunction says that a direct or canoni-
cal verification of a conjunction is constituted by the direct or canonical 
verifications of both conjuncts and truth is explained in such a way that a 
sentence is true if and only if there is a direct or canonical verification of 
it, then the introduction rule of conjunction is shown to be truth-preserving 
by the analysis of the meaning of conjunction. Moreover, if knowledge of 
meaning is knowledge of the conditions under which truth applies to sen-
tences, we expect to know whether truth is preserved from the premises 
to the conclusion of any logical inference through the sole analysis of the 
meanings of the logical constants. Elimination rules and all other logical 
rules of inference are to be proved valid in virtue of the meanings of the 
logical constants.27 Therefore, premise (1), that is the request for the vali-
dation of the logical rules of inference, is implied by TM. By contrast, the 
theorist who endorses UM holds that the validity of the rules of inference 
does not need to flow from the analysis of the meanings of the logical 
constants, rather the meanings of the logical constants are constituted by 
the acceptance of those rules of inference. In sum, to assume without any 
27 In intuitionistic logic their validation is achieved by means of the normalization of 
deductions. See Prawitz (1965), (1971), (1973), (1974).
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argument the truth of premise (1) begs the question against UM. In addi-
tion, we have seen that the argument that Dummett presents, which is the 
threat of inflation into holism, is not sound.
4. Analyticity and Meaning Constitution
It might be objected that if one rejects TM and along with it premise (1), 
one abandons a way of giving philosophical foundation to logic. The philo-
sophical foundation of logic is an explanation of logical truth and logical 
validity, which is grounded on the analysis of the meanings of the logical 
constants and is supposed to prove logical truths and logically valid infer-
ences to be empirically unrevisable. The idea is that the philosophy of 
language ought to provide a philosophically acceptable semantics, where 
a philosophically acceptable semantics contributes to the explanation of 
the apriority of logic. In other terms, the philosophy of language ought 
to serve the epistemological purpose of proving the apriority of logic by 
showing logic to be analytic.
This view is in line with Dummett’s distinction between three levels 
of justification of a logical system.28 The first is the level where an argu-
ment is validated by giving a proof from its premises to its conclusion 
by using simpler rules of inference that are already recognised as valid. 
The second is the level where a proof of soundness, and possibly of com-
pleteness, is given for a logical system. This is the level where logicians 
are involved. The third is the level where one looks for an explanation 
of how deduction is possible at all. This is the level where philosophers, 
more specifically philosophers of language, are engaged. The difference 
between the second and the third level, Dummett says, is that at the third 
level semantics is connected to the theory of meaning and a semantic the-
ory is accepted only if it can be extended to a plausible theory of meaning 
that provides a model for the understanding of language. So conceived, 
semantics is subject to criteria of evaluation that do not belong to logic 
but to the philosophy of language.29 As a result, a soundness proof for a 
logical system acquires a philosophical significance because it provides a 
justification for the rules of inference based on the analysis of meaning. 
Indeed, what a soundness proof is taken to show is that certain sentences 
and certain rules of inference are respectively true and truth-preserving in 
virtue of the meanings of the logical constants occurring in them. In other 
28 Cf. Dummett (1978: 297).
29 See, for example, Dummett (1977: 370): “… the semantic theory itself is to be 
judged by criteria that do not belong to logic, properly so called, but to the philosophy of 
language”.
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words, a soundness proof would show that certain sentences and rules of 
inference are analytic, in the sense that knowledge of their meanings suf-
fices to hold them respectively true and truth-preserving, independently 
of empirical evidence so that analytic sentences and inferences become 
empirically unrevisable.
Of course, the phrase “knowledge of meaning” must be taken in a 
broad sense.30 The knowledge of meaning that is supposed to justify logical 
truths and logical inferences is not merely the knowledge of meaning that 
we can ascribe to competent speakers. For instance, the kind of knowledge 
that we ascribe when we say that an competent English speaker knows that 
the word “dog” means DOG. Rather, “knowledge of meaning” stands for 
the theory of meaning that philosophers develop to explain how ordinary 
speakers are entitled to accept certain truths and to make certain infer-
ences without any justificational reliance on experience.31 As Hale and 
Wright (2000: 296 n.) say, the theory that explains a priori knowledge is 
offered as a piece of reconstructive epistemology and not as a psychologi-
cal hypothesis. Thus, a speaker who derives a theorem in logic is entitled 
to make the inferential steps of the proof and can be said to know a priori 
the truth of the theorem because philosophers are able to offer a model 
that explains, and thereby justifies, his entitlement.32 A clear example of 
this line of thought is Peacocke’s (1992) theory of concepts. According 
to Peacocke, a concept is individuated by certain possession condition, 
namely the condition that a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that 
concept. For the sake of simplicity, let us take concepts to be the mean-
ings of linguistic expressions. For example, consider the concept AND as 
that concept that a speaker grasps and expresses by being able to use an 
expression “and” in accordance with the following rules of inference:
P 
Q         P & Q    P & Q
P & Q    P    Q
In addition, Peacocke says, a concept is individuated by a determination 
theory, which is a theory that tells how the semantic value of the concept 
is determined given its possession condition. Specifically, the determina-
tion theory of a concept assigns to it the semantic value that makes the 
sentences and the inferences involved in the possession condition respec-
tively true and truth-preserving.33 This picture explains the analyticity of 
certain sentences and rules of inference. For example, the determination 
30 Cf. Boghossian (1997: 357).
31 Cf. Peacocke (2000: 265).
32 For the distinction between entitlement and justification see Burge (1993).
33 Cf. Peacocke (1992: 19).
41M. VIGNOLO: Meaning, Classical Logic and Semantic Realism
theory of the concept AND says that its semantic value is that binary truth-
function that makes the inferences featuring in its possession condition 
truth-preserving. Thereby, the classical truth-function for conjunction is 
taken to be the semantic value of the concept AND. If one knows the pos-
session condition of the concept AND and its semantic value, one is able 
to know that the above rules of inference are truth-preserving in advance 
of any empirical information about the ways the world is. And this gives 
foundation to those rules of inferences as knowable a priori.
Two considerations are in order. The first consideration is that, al-
though the examples presented by Peacocke accord with the classical two 
valued semantics, the whole picture fits also the antirealistic semantics 
and in particular Dummett’s view that deduction is in need of a philoso-
phical justification grounded on the analysis of the meanings of the logical 
constants.34 The second consideration is that Peacocke’s view that con-
cepts are individuated by possession conditions and determination theo-
ries might be regarded as an explication of Dummett’s idea that a theory 
of meaning is composed by a core, the semantics, and a shell, the theory 
of sense – or theory of understanding. The theory of sense tells what the 
knowledge of the semantic values consists in by specifying practical abili-
ties of using linguistic expressions, and on the other hand semantics gives 
the validation of the sentences and rules of inference involved in the speci-
fication of those practical abilities in such a way that the assignments of 
semantic values are correct only if they provide such validation35 and sat-
isfy the constraints posed by the theory of sense. It is just for the reason 
that the classical two valued semantics does not satisfy those constraints 
that Dummett holds that the classical two valued semantics cannot be the 
core of the theory of meaning.
I agree that the following point should be conceded: without TM one 
cannot validate the classical logical rules of inference through the analysis 
of the meanings of the logical constants and, as a consequence, one can-
not credit the logical principles and the logical rules of inference with 
the privileged status of analyticity. So, one lacks a philosophical source 
for giving foundation to logic. Certainly, this is a trouble for those phi-
losophers who believe that philosophy has a foundational role in respect 
of science. However, there is at least one philosophical view according 
to which foundationalism is too much demanding: naturalism. According 
to naturalism, the only way of gaining knowledge is the empirical way 
that is the basis of science. There is no privileged and a priori perspec-
tive from which our inferential practice can be legitimised or criticised 
34 Peacocke (1992: 19), (2000: 261) acknowledges this point.
35 Peacocke (1987: 166) holds explicitly this point.
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apart from the standard scientific canons such as, say, predictive adequacy 
and simplicity. Conceptual analysis cannot be the source of a priori and 
empirically unrevisable knowledge. Quine’s doctrine of epistemological 
holism and his web-of-beliefs model are the paradigmatic representation 
of naturalism,36 according to which all sentences face the tribunal of expe-
rience not individually, but only as a corporate body. The periphery of the 
web, which is composed of observational sentences confronts experience 
directly. But even the centre, which is composed of the allegedly analytic 
sentences and rules of inference, is indirectly connected to experience. 
So, if a prediction is refuted, in principle one might choose to abandon 
the logic employed to derive it. Thus, in principle, any part of the theory 
might be subject to revision and the revision of any part can be accom-
modated by adjustments in other parts of the theory. Any sentence, even 
of logic and mathematics, is revisable in principle in light of empirical 
evidence and mathematics and logic too have empirical content and are 
justifiable to the extent that the predictions derived with their contribution 
are confirmed by the empirical evidence.
That all sentences are revisable in light of empirical evidence does 
not imply that no distinction can be drawn between empirical sentences 
and weakly a priori sentences. A weakly a priori sentence is a sentence 
that speakers learn to accept even in absence of any particular sensory 
inputs. On the basis of this definition, many of the sentences that UM re-
gards as meaning constitutive turn out to be weakly a priori. Furthermore, 
although the meaning constitutive sentences form the conceptual structure 
of the corporate body of theories that, as a whole, is tested against the em-
pirical evidence, the justification for accepting a given conceptual struc-
ture still comes from the empirical adequacy of the whole corporate body 
of theories. And finally, the empirical adequacy of the whole corporate 
body of theories is not the sole criterion for the assessment of a conceptual 
structure. In addition to empirical adequacy, there are other conditions that 
a conceptual structure must fulfill to gain justification. Among them one 
can list consistency, simplicity, nomic force. It is worth noting, then, that 
also the justification of a conceptual structure can be rationally assessed 
as a theoretical question with a precise cognitive content. As Quine (1948: 
16–17) argued, the criteria for adopting a given conceptual structure are 
the same we employ to confirm scientific hypothesis. In general, changes 
in conceptual structures result in new ways of theorizing the empirical 
phenomena, and advocates of different conceptual structures might have 
a genuine cognitive dispute about the question of what way of theorizing 
36 See Quine (1951).
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such phenomena is the best one. In this naturalistic picture, semantics is 
on a par with logic and mathematics as being at the centre of the web-of-
beliefs. It gives the truth-conditional interpretation of our assertoric and 
inferential abilities and explains part of the nature of linguistic expres-
sions, but it is no longer a philosophical tool for giving foundation to 
parts of our knowledge. On the contrary, Dummett is interested in saving 
the foundational role of philosophy, and more precisely of the philosophy 
of language. This is another aspect that shows how deeply TM underlies 
Dummett’s way of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning is use.
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